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PERPETUITIES REFORM THROUGH
JUDICIAL ADOPTION OF COMPLETE CY PRES
Legislation and judicial decisions have brought about sweeping
reforms of the orthodox Rule Against Perpetuities' [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Rule] in the United States.2 Legislative activity directed
at perpetuities reform has been considerable, 3 whereas judicial activity
has been limited since perpetuities reform has normally been felt to
be the burden of the legislature.4 The traditional approach of the
judiciary when presented with a perpetuities problem has been con-
struction to avoid the harsh results of the Rule,5 but strained construc-
tion to save a gift is quite apparent at times.6 Some courts have, how-
ever, assumed the burden of perpetuities reform.7 The Supreme Court
of Hawaii, without benefit of legislation, when presented with the prob-
lem of a will establishing a testamentary trust which could not be con-
strued to avoid violation of the Rule, initiated perpetuities reform by
applying the doctrine of equitable approximation-cy pres.8 The court
'Gray's classic statement of the Rule is: "No interest is good unless it must
vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation
of the interest." J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUrIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
2R. LYNN, THE MODERN RifLE AGAINST PERPETUrrIES 197 (1966).
12 REAL PROP. PRO. & TRUST J. 176 (1967); Reprinted in ABA PERPETUITIES
LEGISLATION 'HANDBOOK (3d ed. 1967).
'E.g., Beverlin v. First Nat'l Bank, 151 Kan. 307, 98 P.2d 200 (194o). The court
states:
Nothwithstanding these divergent views, we think the rule in
Leake v. Robinson ... having been followed by the courts of
England and America for a century has become an integral part
of the common law rule, and if a change is to be made it must
,be made by the legislature.
98 P.2d at 204.
'See Browder, Construction, Reformation, and the Rule Against Perpetuities,
62 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1963); Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv.
638 (1938).
"See Forman v. Troup, 3o Ga. 496 (186o); Colt v. Industrial Trust Co., 5o R.I.
242, 146 A. 628 (1929); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24-45 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).7See In re Foster's Estate, x9o Kan. 498, 376 P.2d 784 (1962) (excision of part
of will which would invalidate gift); Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321, 140 So. 2d
843 (1962) (limited cy pres-reduction of age contingency); Merchants Nat'l Bank
v. Curtis, 99 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207 (1953) ("wait-and-see"; for explanation of this
doctrine see note 14 infra.); Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, P1 A. goo (1891)
(limited cy pres-reduction of age contingency).
8Cy pres is derived from the French phrase "cy pres comme possible" which
means "as near as possible." G. BoGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 167 (4th ed. 1963).
Complete cy pres-In the event any interest would otherwise violate the Rule
Against Perpetuities, reform the interest, within the limits of the Rule, to approxi-
mate most closely the intention of the creator of the interest.
Limited cy pres-Reformation confined to legislatively or judicially specified
interests which violate the Rule. An example would be the reduction of an age
contingency to bring it within the limits of the Rule. See W. SCHWARTZ, FuTu
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held that any interest which would violate the Rule should be reformed
within the limits of that rule to approximate most closely the intention
of the creator of the interest.9 This holding apparently puts Hawaii in
the unique position of being the only state that has judicially adopted
complete cy pres as a perpetuities reform measure. 10
In In re Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop," the testator died in 1954
and was survived by his wife (who was still living when this decision was
handed down), four sons and twelve daughters. The action was filed in
1967 and questions on the validity of his testamentary trust under the
Rule were reserved to the Supreme Court for answer and decision. The
section of the testator's will in question provided: "This trust shall cease
and determine upon the death of my wife, Chun Lai Shee, or thirty (3o)
years from the date of my death, whichever shall last occur."'12 Upon
termination of the trust, the principal and accumulated income was to
vest in and be transferred to the beneficiaries. Three-fourths was to go
to the survivors of the four sons and the lawful issue of any deceased
son. One-fourth was to go to the survivors of the twelve daughters and
the lawful issue of any deceased daughter.'8 Since the testator's wife
might have' 4 died within nine years after testator's death, the trust
INTERESTS AND ESTATE PLANNING §§ 6.37-6.38 (1965); Leach, Perpetuities: What
Legislatures, Courts and Practitioners Can Do About The Follies of the Rule, 13
U. KAN. L. REv. 351, 359 (1965).
A distinction between the doctrine of equitable approximation and cy pres
was drawn in National Bank of Greece v. Savarika, 167 Miss. 571, 148 So. 649 (1933).
However, as applied in the United States, the two doctrines are generally equated.
State ex rel. Attorney General v. Van Buren School Dist. No. 42, 191 Ark 1o96,
89 S.W.2d 6o5 (1936); In re Succession of Milne, 23o La. 729, 89 So. 2d 281 (1956).
For the principle of operation of the cy pres doctrine see note x8 infra.
91n re Estate of Chun Quan Yee Hop, 469 P.2d 183, 187 (Hawaii 197o).
"2 Other courts have adopted partial perpetuities reform measures. See In re
Foster's Estate, igo Kan. 498, 376 P.2d 784 (1962); Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321,
14o So. 2d 843 (i962); Merchant's Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 99 N.H. 225, 97 A.2d 207
(1953); Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31. A.9oo (1891)
2 4 69 P.2d 183 (Hawaii 1970).
221d. at 184.
uConsidering testator's children only, intestacy would result in equal division
among the children. HAwAu R.v. STAT. § 532-4(1968). This would work a complete
mathematical reversal of testator's plan as to the male and female groups. Three-
fourths would go to the female line (x2 members) and one-fourth would go to the
male line (4 members).
"'The classic possibilities test for perpetuities is referred to as the Might-Have-
Been rule.
The principle that in judging the validity of an interest under
the Rule [Against Perpetuities], you must view possibilities (births,
deaths, etc.) as of the creation of the interest (death of the testator,
for example) and ignore events as they have actually occurred.
Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REv. 973, 992 (1965):
1971]
186 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
estate was not certain to vest within the life of his wife (the specified life
in being) or twenty-one years thereafter. The will expressly stated
whichever shall last occur and thus the trust clearly violated the ortho-
dox Rule Against Perpetuities.' 5
The court considered the judicial origin of the Rule and declined
to agree that its hands were tied when faced with this judge-made rule
of the common law.' 6 In reaching its decision to reform the will by re-
ducing the thirty year period to twenty-one years, the court analyzed the
policy of the Rule which was devised to prevent the tying up of prop-
erty in future estates for an unreasonable period of time. The more
important aspects of this policy against tying up property in future
estates are the freeing of wealth and the Rule's conducive effect in
giving the ultimate recipient complete power of management and dis-
position over that which is to be his. The most important aspect,
however, is the social policy of letting the living, rather than the dead,
control the wealth of the world.' 7 These aspects of the Rule were not
see, Jee v. Audley, I Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (Ch. 1787). The reform response
to the Might-Have-Been rule is "wait-and-see," an actualities test. In determining
whether an interest would violate the Rule under "wait-and-see," the period of
perpetuities is measured by actual rather than possible events. R. LYNN, Tim
MODERN RuLE AGAINsr PE 'Erurrms io-si (1966). For example, "wait-and-see" could
have been applied to validate the trust in the principal case since testator's wife
was still alive when this action was brought more than 12 years after his death
which commenced the So year period. Thus the trust, viewed from the time of the
action, could not vest beyond the life in being and twenty-one years considering
what actually occurred.
wThe Rule restricts the creator of every private trust by requiring him to
provide for the certain vesting of all contingent interests under or following his
trust not later than 21 years after the end of some life or lives in being at the
time the trust instrument goes into effect. G. BoGERT, LAw OF TRusTs § 50 (4th ed.
1963); 1 A. Scorr, LAw OF TRUsTs § 62.10 (3d ed. 1967).
1 The court was apparently acting in the spirit of Chief Justice Vanderbilt's dis-
senting opinion in Fox v. Snow, 6 N.J. 12, 76 A.2d 877 (195o). The opinion reads
in part: 'To hold, as the majority opinion implies, that the only way to overcome
the unfortunate rule of law that plagues us here is by legislation, is to put the
common law in a self-imposed strait jacket." 76 A.2d at 882.
17469 P.2d 183, 186 (Hawaii 197o); see L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD
HAND 58 (1955); Dukeminier, Perpeutities Revision in California: Perpetual Trust
Permitted, 55 CALF. L. REv. 678, 691 (1967); see also J. Moius & W. B. LEACH,
THE RULE AOAINST PERPETurriEs, 13-18, 26-30 (2d ed. 1962);. Leach, Perpetuities
Legislation: Hail Pennsylvania!, lo8 U. PA. L. REv. 1124, 1133-42 (1966). For discus-
sion of limitations upon testamentary dispositions in the United States see Cahn,
Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 139 (1936); Scott, Control of Property
by the Dead (pts. 1-2), 65 U. PA. L. REv. 527, 632 (1917); Note, Protection of the
Family Against Disinheritance in American Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 293 (1965).
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found to be inconsistent with the application of the cy pres' 8 doctrine
to a testamentary trust. No harm would be done to the underlying poli-
cies of the Rule, nor to the testator's general intent, by reducing the
invalid thirty year term to twenty-one years, thus bringing the trust
within the Rule and making it valid in its entirety.1 9 The dissenting
opinion strongly objected to the reasoning of the majority, stating that
the policy of the Rule and the policy of giving effect to the testator's in-
tent because the law abhors intestacy were not compatible in this case.
From the dissent's viewpoint, the Rule is a rule of law and not a test
to determine intention like a rule of construction. The Rule's object is
to defeat intention20 and is therefore to be remorselessly applied. The
dissent questioned why the majority did not directly do away with the
Rule in view of their holding in the face of such a clear violation.2 '
The majority, however, did not consider their holding to be a complete
emasculation of the Rule. On the contrary, the majority emphasized
that the Rule has its support in the practical needs of modem times and
is of continuing vitality.22 The majority's decision to reform the
trust was also influenced by the ease with which the attorney who
drafted the will could have accomplished the exact intentions of the
testator without violating the Rule.23 Authority for the court's judicial
adoption of cy pres was found in New Hampshire24 and Mississippi2 5
decisions. Through cy pres, these courts judicially reformed age con-
tingencies that would have invalidated testamentary gifts. Recom-
'6The doctrine of cy pres operates on the principle that "where there is a
general and a particular intent, and the particular one cannot take effct, the words
shall be construed to give effect to the general intent." Robinson v. Hardcastle, 2
Durn. & E. 241, 254, 1o Eng. Rep. 131, 138 (K.B. 1788); see Carter v. Berry, 243
Miss. 321, 140 So. 2d 843 (1962); Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. goo (1891).
This doctrine has normally been confined to charitable trusts. G. BOGERT, LAW
or TRusTs § 147 (4th ed. 1963).
"469 P.2d 183, 185-87 (Hawaii 1970).
21A thorough discussion of this controverted aspect of the Rule is beyond the
scope of this comment. A comparison of approaches in applying the Rule may be
found at 6 AMEucAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 24.44-24.46 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
21469 P.2d 183, 187-88 (Hawaii 1970).
22 d. at 186.
211d. at 186-87.
"Edgerly v. Barker, 66 N.H. 434, 31 A. goo (1891). The opinion by Chief
Justice Doe in this case, which reduced a 40 year age contingency to 21, was
severely criticized by Professor Gray. See J. GRAY, THE RuLE AGAINST PERPETUrrES §§
857-93 (4th ed. 1942). No doubt this had a potent effect in constricting the cy pres
doctrine to the confines of New Hampshire for more than half a century. Leach,
Perpeuities: Cy Pres on the March, 17 VAND. L. REv. 1381, 1384-85 (1964).
2Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321, 140 So. 2d 843 (1962).
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mendations of perpetuities reform writers26 and the legislative reform
movement27 were also noted by the court.
The perpetuities reform movement has been a response to the tra-
ditional doctrine of striking down an interest which may vest too re-
motely.28 This harshness is compounded by the doctrine of Leake v.
Robinson29 which invalidates the gifts to all members of a class if one
member's gift is invalid 3 0 Adding to the disrepute of the orthodox
Rule has been some of the fantastic consequences3 ' of the classic pos-
sibilities test, the "Might-Have-Been" rule.32 Furthermore, ignoring
a testator's obvious intent and striking down his bequest because the
drafter of his will was inexpert as to the intricacies of the Rule or trans-
gressed a technical line seems basically unjust.
33 -
There are those who caution that the cures offered for perpetuities
2469 P.2d at 187; see R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPErurrIEs (1966);
Browder, Construction, Reformation, and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 MICH.
L. REV. 1 (1963); Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REV. 638 (1938);
Quarles, The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule Against
Perpetuities and Trusts for Accumulation, 21 N.Y.U.L. REv. 384 (1946). For a
selected list of articles concerning perpetuities reform see 2 REAL PROP. PRO. &
TRUST J. 176, 210 (1967).
7469 P.2d at 187; see CAL. CaV. CODE § 715.5 (West Supp. 1970); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45-95, 45-96 (1960); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 55-111 (1957); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 3o, §§ 191-95 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); KY. REV. STAT. § 381.216 (1969); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 101-02 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, §§ 11-102,
11-103 (1969); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 184A, §§ 1-2 (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 442.555
(Supp. 1969); N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 9-1.2 (McKinney 1967); N.Y.
PERs. PRop. LAW § ll-a(McKinney 1962); OHIO REv. CODE § 2131.o8 (Baldwin Supp.
1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 301.4-301.5 (1950); TEX. REv. Cnv. STAT. ANN.
art. 1291b, §§ 1-4 (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1967); WASH. REV
CODE §§ 11.98.010-11.98.030 (1965).
128 REAL PROP. PRO. & TRUST J. 176, 18o-8i (1967).
22 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817).
316 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 24.26 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
"'See R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUrrIES 57-88 (1966); Leach,
Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARv. L. REv. 638 (1938).
1 Note 14 supra.
3
3See J. MORRIs & W. B. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 18, 26, 36
(2d ed., 1962); W. B. LEACH & 0. TUDOR, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUrTIES § 24.11
(1957); Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell, 51 HARV. L. REv. 638 (1938); Quarles,
The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties and Trusts for Accumulation, 21 N.Y.U.L. REv. 384 (1946); Quarles, The Cy
Pres Doctrine with Reference to the Rule Against Perpetuities-An Advocation of its
Adoption in all Jurisdictions, 38 AM. L. REv. 683 (19o4); cf. Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal.
2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
Lucas held in part that the rules relating to perpetuities were fraught with such
confusion and concealed traps that an attorney violating the rules could not be
held negligent as a matter of law. (What recourse do the intended beneficiaries
have?) Curiously, this case was cited in the dissenting opinion of the principal case.
469 P.2d 183, 188 (Hawaii 1970).
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reform might be worse than the disease.3 4 But accepting the need for
reform, is complete cy pres35 the best method? As noted before, the
traditional approach of the judiciary when faced with a perpetuities
problem is construction. The major question concerning this method
is how far it is proper to select one construction on the ground that this
renders a gift valid under the Rule in preference to another construc-
tion which renders the gift invalid. Professor Gray acknowledged that it
is only "human nature for judges ... to be influenced by the natural
desire to construe deeds and wills so as to carry out, as far as possible,
the intention of the settlors and testators .... "36 He deemed this na-
tural desire, however, an "irregular action of the judicial mind .... "37
The situation may arise where a construction to render a gift valid
reluctantly cannot be given by a court, even though the testator's pri-
mary intent may be obvious. The court will state or imply its reason for
not substituting its judgment for the testator's in such terms as "We
are unable to make a new will for the testator."3 8 However, a court in
invalidating a gift in a will does in fact "make a new will for the testa-
tor. '3 0 If the public policy of the Rule prohibits the attainment of a
testator's specific objectives, there still remains his general dispositive
intent. It is on this general intent that the cy pres doctrine operates. 40
Within the limits of the Rule, complete cy pres reforms any interest
sIBordwell, Perpetuities From the Standpoint of the Draughtsman, ii RuTGERs
L. REV. 429, 435 (1956); see Mechem, Further Thoughts on the Pennsylvania Per-
petuities Legislation, xo7 U. PA. L. REV. 965, 983 (1959); Simes, Is the Rule Against
Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait-and-See" Doctrine, 52 MICH. L. REv. 179, 190
(1953), Sparks, A Decade of Transition in Future Interests, 45 VA. L. REv. 493,
513 "16 (1959)-
:fThe application of the cy pres doctrine to the Rule Against Perpetuities was
recommended as long ago as 1904 by Quarles, The Cy-Pres Doctrine with Reference
to the Rule Against Perpetuities-An Advocation of its Adoption in all Jurisdictions,
38 Amr. L. REv. 683 (19o4), revised and republished as Quarles, The Cy-Pres Doctrine:
Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule Against Perpetuities and Trusts for
Accumulation, 21 N.Y.U.L. REv. 384 (1946).
35J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUMES § 632 (4th ed. 1942).
71ld.
"One of the objections voiced by the dissent in the principal case was that
the majority exercised a power that it did not have, namely, "making a new will
for the testator." 469 P.2d 183, 188 (Hawaii 1970).
30E.g., Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817); 6 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 2443-2446 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952); J. MORRIs & W. B. LEAcs,
THE Rulm AGAINsr PERs'ruEis 244-55 (2d ed. 1962). Two rules of construction
have been established to mitigate the harshness of the Leake rule. First, where there
is a gift of a stated sum to each member of a class, some members may take although
the gifts to others fail. E.g., Storrs v. Benbow, 4 De. G.M.&G. 390, 43 Eng. Rep.
153 (Ch. 1853). Second, where the class is itself composed of sub-classes, some groups
may take although the gifts to others fail. E.g., Smith's Estate v. Commissioner,
140 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1944).
"ONote 18 supra.
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which would violate that rule so as to approximate most clearly the
creator's intention. Cy pres is more realistic as to its nature and limita-
tions than is strained construction. The alternations necessary for the
reformation "of an invalid interest which will most closely approximate
the donor's stated objectives will be more evident than in many cases
where his stated directions are ambiguous."
41
A leading authority has stated:
Once it is perceived how or why an interest offends the Rule,
that alteration which would escape the offense tends to suggest
itself. In doing so, it presents at the same time the way to pre-
serve the donor's original intention to the fullest extent pos-
sible.
42
Complete cy pres is not a full-circle return to "where-ever [sic] any
visible Inconvenience doth appear,"43 for there are two essential stand-
ards for cy pres.44 First, the result of the reformation must be within
the limits of the Rule. Second, the result of the reformation must pre-
serve to the fullest extent possible the intent of the testator within the
limits of the -Rule.
Attempts at legislative perpetuities reform in the United States
have been made for over a century.45 However, substituting new rules,
such as the New York "two lives" rule,46 has produced unsatisfactory
results.47 A more acceptable reform method has been to retain the com-
"Browder, Construction, Reformation, and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62
MICH. L. REV. 1, 18 (1963).
4Id. at 31. See J. MoRRIs & W. B. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETurrIES 35
(2d ed. 1962); But see LAW REFORm COMMITrEE, FouRTH REPORT, CMND. No. 18
(1956), an English report which rejected a broad cy pres proposal on the grounds
that the impact of a general power of reformation would not be easy to foretell
and the jurisdiction would be difficult in its exercise due to inherent complexity
and uncertainty. Limited rather than complete cy pres was enacted in England.
See Perpetuities and Accumulations Act 1964, c. 55.
7The Duke of Norfolk's Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 49, 22 Eng. Rep. 931, 96o (1682).
44Browder, Construction, Reformation, and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62
MICH. L. REv. 1, 31 (1963).
"See R. LYNN, THE MODERN RuLE AGAINST PERPEuITiu s 181 (1966).
"The New York "two lives" rule departed from the common law Rule in two
significant aspects.
First, the period was shortened from (multiple) lives in being,
plus twenty-one years (a period in gross), to two lives in being,
plus a minority. Second, the New York rule invalidated interests
which might vest too remotely, as well as those which might
suspend the absolute power of alienation beyond two lives in
being, plus a minority.
Comment, N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRuSTs LAW § 9-i.1 at 75 (McKinney Supp.
1970).
4R. LYNN, THE MODERN RuE AGAINST PERPErTUTms 181, 19o-92 (1966). 2 REAL
PROP. PRO. & TRUST J. 176, 181 (1967); see also 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§
25.1-25.35 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952). A practice commentary discussing New York's
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mon law rule and enact legislation to prevent the harsh application of
the Rule in specific situations where the possibility of remote vesting
is improbable or merely theoretical.
48
Legislative reform of more general application covering specific
situations as well as a wide range of perpetuities violations has been
enacted primarily within the past two decades. 49 The most contro-
versial of these reforms has been the "wait-and-see" statute.50 "Wait-
and-see" is an actualities test5' of validity rather than the possibilities
test of the Might-Have-Been rule52 and permits the court, in passing
on the validity of an interest, to consider facts which have occurred
after the creation of an interest. The interest is good unless the creator
has violated the Rule, in fact.53 One of the major objections to the
"wait-and-see" doctrine is the waiting, that is, the deferral of deter-
mination of the validity of an interest until events have actually oc-
curred.54 Postponing a perpetuities problem may appear attractive, but
the drawback is that an interested party may not be able to obtain a
ruling on the validity of a future interest during the waiting period.
Although deferral may be acceptable in some situations,5 early deter-
abandonment of the "two lives" rule and return to the common law perpetuity
period may be found in N.Y. ESTATES, POWERS AND TRUSTS LAw § 9-1.1 (McKinney
Supp. 1970).
482 REAL PROP. PRO. & TRusT J. 176, 181, 188-97 (1967).
" Statutes cited note 63 and note 75 infra.
r~T'he law review articles concerned with this controversy are voluminous. The
following is by no means all-inclusive. Br~gy, A Defense of Pennsylvania's Statute
on Perpetuities, 23 TEMP. L.Q. 313 (195o); Dukeminier, Kentucky Perpetuities Law
Restated and Reformed, 49 Ky. L.J. 1 (196o); Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail
Pennsylvania!, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1124 (1960); Mechem, Further Thoughts on the
Pennsylvania Perpetuities Legislation, 1o7 U. PA. L. REv. 965 (1959); Simes, Is the
Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait-and-See" Doctrine, 52 Micr. L. REv.
179 (1953); Sparks, A Decade of Transition in Future Interests, 45 VA. L. Rjv. 493
(1959); Tudor, The Impact of Recent Statutory Adoption of the "Wait and See"
Principle on the Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities, 38 B.U.L. Rxv. 540 (1958).
"Note 14 supra.
raid.
63R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPEruriES I86 (1966); see Leach,
Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARv. L. REv. 973, 992 (1965).
"R. LYNN, THE MODERN RuLE AGAINST PERPETWUTIEs 183 (1966); 2 REAL PROP.
PRO. & TRUsT J. 176, 182 (1967); see generally Browder, Construction, Reformation,
and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 MicH. L. REv. i (1963); Simes, Is the Rulc
Against Perpetuities Doomed? The "Wait-and-See" Doctrine, 52 Micn. L. Rv. 179
(1953).
'Common situations where courts are prepared to "wait-and-see," even at
common law are: Appointment under special powers; gifts in default of appointed;
gifts expressed to take effect on two alternative contingencies, one valid and the other
too remote (separable alternate contingencies). J. MORRIs & W. B. LEAcH, THE
RULE AGAINST Pr.RpurvrrxFs 181-83 (2d ed. 1962); see also Lynn, A Practical Guide
to the Rule Against Perpetuities, 1964 DuKE L.J. 207.
19711
192 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII
mination may be essential 50 or desirable 57 in others. Another objection
to the "wait-and-see" doctrine is the problem of measuring lives. At
common law an interest to be valid must vest within lives in being and
twenty-one years.58 This certainty-of-vesting requirement 59 adequately
governed the selection of measuring lives. But if you "wait-and-see" in
order to allow vesting to occur, the certainty-of-vesting requirement is
negated. The question is, "Whose life may be taken as the measure of
the period of waiting?O 0 Removal of this objection has been attempted
by requiring a "causal relation" of the measuring life,61 but the cen-
tral argument supporting "wait-and-see" with its attendant problem of
measuring lives is confidence that courts will not push the perpetuities
period to its outer limits.
6 2
An additional legislative reform has been to combine "wait-and-see"
with cy pres.63 One problem with this is the question of priority in
application, 64 but the major objection is the same as that to enacting
5Tstate tax problems can make early determination essential. E.g., Second
Bank-State St. Trust Co., Ex'r v. Second Bank-State St. Trust Co., Trustee, 335
Mass. 407, 14o N.E.2d 2oi (1957); see INT. REV. CODE OP 1954 §§ 2033, 2037.
WSee Simes, Is the Rule Against Perpetuities Doomed? The Wait-and-See
Doctrine?, 52 Mxcu. L. REv. 179 (1953).
raj. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4 th ed. 1942).
59Note 15 supra.
002 REAL PROP. PRO. & TRusT J. 176, 182 (1967); Simes, Is the Rule Against
Perpetuities Doomed? The Wait-and-See Doctrine, 52 MiCH. L. REv. 179, 186-88
(1953); cf. R. LYNN, TiE MODERN RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 184 (1966). But see
Leach, Perpetuities Legislation: Hail Pennsylvania!, io8 U. PA. L. REV. 1124,
1142-47 (196o).
OSee KY. REv. STAT. § 381.216 (1969) which reads in part: "Mhe [perpetuities]
period shall not be measured by any lives whose continuance does not have a
causal relationship to the vesting or failure of the interest." See also 2 REAL
PROP. PRO. & TRUST J. 176, 184-85 (1967).
62J. MoRius & W. B. LEACH, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUrEIES 90 (2d ed. 1962);
2 REAL PROP. PRO. & TRUST J. 176, 186 (1967); Browder, Construction, Reformation,
and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 Micm. L. REv. 1, 12 (1963). Limited "wait-and-
see" statutes provide for the measuring lives problem. See CONN. GRN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 45-95, 45-96 (1960); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 1l-o2 (1964); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 93, §§ 11-102, 1i-1o3 (1969); MAss. ANN. LAWS, ch. 184A, §§ 1-2 (s969).
OLegislative enactments combining cy pres and "wait-and-see" include: CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-95,45-96 (ig6o); KY. REV. STAT. § 381.216 (1969); ME. REv,. STAT.
ANN. tit. 33, §§ 101-02 (1964); 'MD. ANN. CODE art. 93, §§ 11-102, 11-1o3 (1969);
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 184 A, §§ 1-2 (1969); OHIo REV. CODE § 2131.08 (Baldwin Supp.
1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (1967); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 11.98.010-11.98.O0
(1959).
"R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 39-41 (1966); see Browder,
Construction, Reformation, and the Rule Against Perpetuities 62 MiCH. L. REv. i
(1963). "Wait-and-see" is applied before cy pres since by waiting it will often turn
out that the disposition will not need to be reformed. If cy pres reformation is still
necessary, the changes required to validate the gift may have become obvious. On
the other hand, the benefit of an early resolution of a perpetuity problem through
reformation is lost by waiting. 2 REAL PROP. PRO. & TRUST J. 176, 186-87 (1967).
CASE COMMENTS
cy pres alone. The objection to cy pres is that it appears to confer on a
court unfettered discretion to determine the intent of a testator who is
obviously unable to contradict that determination. 65 But courts use
discretion in construing dispositive instruments that are ambiguous or
incomplete. They employ essentially the same frame of reference that
would be used to reform an interest within the limits of the Rule and
approximate most closely the intention of the creator, namely, the in-
tention of the creator as revealed by his entire instrument in the light
of attending circumstances.66 There is the risk that a court may abuse
such discretion in reforming, but "it is better to suffer such a risk, than
to suffer, not the risk, but the continued certain overthrow of too
large a proportion of family arrangements which by reformation would
be saved." 67 Generally, a "perpetuities question may properly be raised
whenever the validity of a contingent future interest is a relevant factor
in decision."6 38 Cy pres thus offers a major advantage over "wait-and-see"
since immediate determination of a perpetuities problem is possible by
reformation. 09 "The Rule in 'cy pres' form tells us that a contingent
future interest that is prima facie bad may be reformed. 'Cy pres' does
not tell us whether the contingent future interest will be reformed, or
when it will be reformed, or how it will be reformed." 70 Therefore, cy
pres reformation cannot be mandatory and would not preclude other
methods of validating an interest since its self-limitations are the gen-
eral intent of the creator and the limits of the Rule. If other methods of
validating an interest such as "wait-and-see" or separability of alter-
nate contingencies7' would best effect the creator's general intent, they
could be used. The Supreme Court of Hawaii recognized this in the
principal case by not precluding other types of arguments for validating
062 REAL PROP. PRO. & TRUST J. 176, 186 (1967); Schuyler, Should the Rule
Against Perpetuities Discard Its Vest?, 56 MIcH. L. Rv. 683, 718 (1958); Schwartz,
Mr. Justice Kennison and Creative Continuity in Perpetuities Law, 48 B.U.L.
RyV. 207, 217-18 (1968). But cf. R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIFS
185-86 (1966).
ImBrowder, Construction, Reformation, and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62
MAlc. L. Ray. 1, 31 (1963); see 2 REAL PROP. PRO. & TRUST J. 176, 186 (1967); cf. ,
REAL PROP. PRO. & TRUST J. 178 (1968); Fletcher, A Rule of Discrete Invalidity:
Perpetuities Reform Without Waiting, 20 STAN. L. REV. 459 (1968).
6Browder, Construction, Reformation, and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 62
Micu. L. REv. 1, 32 (x963); see R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUTIES I86
(1966).
wR. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 37 (1966).
69R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 36-39 (1966); 2 RYAL PROP.
PRO. & TRUST J. 176, I86 (1967). See Browder, Construction, Reformation, and the
Rule Against Perpetuities, 62 MIcH. L. R.EV. I (1963).
7'R. LYNN, THE MODERN RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 39 (1966).
nFor an explanation of separable alternate contingencies see note 55 supra.
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